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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
TEACY LOAN AND TEUST COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Eespondent. 
vs. 
FEANCIS G. LUKE AND NELLIE 
LUKE, Ms wife; ALICE G. LUKE; 
L. C. LOHDEFEINCK AND JANE 
DOE LOHDEFEINCK, his wife; 
LINUS E. PATTEESON and PETE 
LENDAEIS, 
Defendants. 
SAID NELLIE LUKE, 
Sole Appellant. 
EESPONDENT'S BEIEF 
NO. 4704 
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court of Salt La] 
County; Hon. Wm. M. McCrea, Presiding 
POWEES, EITEE AND COWAN, 
Attorneys for Eesponderit 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY LOAN AND TRUST COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
FRANCIS G. LUKE AND NELLIE 
LUKE, his wife; ALICE G. LUKE; 
L. C. LOHDEFRINCK AND JANE 
DOE LOHDEFRINCK, his wife; 
LINUS E. PATTERSON and PETE 
LENDARIS, 
Defendants. 
SAID NELLIE LUKE, 
Sole Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke were owners in 
common of the real estate involved in this foreclosure. 
Nellie Luke, the appellant, was and is the wife of Fran-
cis G. Luke. The mortgage in favor of respondent, Tracy 
Loan & Trust Company, which is the subject of this 
proceeding, is dated December 1,1917, and was properly 
executed by said Francis G. Luke and Nellie Luke, his 
NO. 4704 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
wife, and Alice Gr. Luke. The coupon note in the prin-
cipal sum of $1300.00 secured by this mortgage was also 
signed by the said Francis G. Luke and Nellie Luke, his 
wife, and the said Alice G. Luke. The real property was 
burdened with a mortgage in the principal sum of 
$1300.00 in favor of respondent when the same was con-
veyed to Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke. The mort-
gage of December 1, 1917 was clearly a renewal mort-
gage, as it is recited therein. The respondent is fore-
closing this mortgage dated December 1st, 1917, executed 
by the parties aforesaid. It is alleged by the respondent 
in its complaint, and so found by the court, (Findings 
9, 10, 11,'Abs. 24 and 25) that the notes and mortgage 
dated December 1, 1920 and the notes and mortgage 
dated December 1, 1923, evidenced the same indebted-
ness as the mortgage dated December 1,1917 in favor of 
this respondent and are evidences of the various exten-
sions of time granted by the respondent, and the defend-
ants Francis G. Luke and Nellie Luke, his wife, and Alice 
G. Luke, have at all times recognized and acknowledged 
said indebtedness and have agreed to pay the same, and 
that said defendants have paid interest on said mortgage 
from time to time and have in writing undertaken and 
agreed to pay said mortgage indebtedness. 
The interest of the respondent Nellie Luke was and 
is that interest created by Section 6406 Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1917. She is not and never has been a fee simple 
title owner of the mortgaged premises. The decree of 
the District Court in foreclosure, foreclosed not only 
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the fee title interest of the defendant Francis G. Luke 
and Alice G. Luke, but also that inchoate right of Nellie 
Luke as wife of the defendant Francis G. Luke. There is 
no question but that the mortgage obligation was due 
and owing by the actual fee title owners of the premises. 
They have not appealed from the foreclosure judgment. 
Only Nellie Luke, the wife of Francis G. Luke, has ap-
pealed. The fee title owners accepted the judgment of 
the District Court and by virtue of the sale thereunder, 
lose all title and interest in the premises. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS IS AN APPEAL ON THE JUDGMENT 
ROLL ALONE WHICH CONTAINS NO BILL OF 
EXCEPTIONS. IN SUCH AN APPEAL THE 
PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE EVIDENCE 
JUSTIFIED THE FINDINGS. 
McGuire vs. State Bank of Tremonton, 
164 Pac. 494 
49 Utah 381 
Raphael vs. Wasatch and J. V. R. 
95 Pac. 1008 
34 Utah 97 
Ryan vs. Kunkel 
90 Pac. 1079 
32 Utah 377 
The court's attention is directed to Finding of Fact 
No. 15: 
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XV. 
That the fee simple to said land is vested in 
Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke * * * and is 
subject to the prior lien o fthe mortgage in favor 
of plaintiff, dated December 1, 1917, * # * which 
said lien of said mortgage has been kept an exist-
ing and legally enforceable lien against said land 
by the written agreements of Francis Gr. Luke 
and Nellie Luke, his wife, and defendant Alice Gr. 
Luke. That the inchoate interest of defendant 
Nellie Luke, wife of Francis Gr. Luke, is subject 
to the lien of plaintiff's mortgage # * *. That 
defendant Nellie Luke, wife of Francis G. Luke, 
did specifically relinquish her inchoate right as 
the wife of the defendant, Francis G. Luke, in 
said property, by the execution and delivery unto 
plaintiff, December 1, 1917, of the mortgage de-
scribed in paragraph VII hereof. 
It will be noticed that the court found that the in-
choate interest of the appellant Nellie Luke is subject 
to the lien of plaintiff's (respondent's) mortgage and 
that said appellant did specifically relinquish her in-
choate right as wife of the defendant Francis G. Luke 
in said property by execution and delivery unto the re-
spondent of the mortgage dated December 1, 1917. By 
Conclusion of Law No. 4, Abs. 29, the court specifically 
concludes that said respondent Nellie Luke renounced 
her inchoate right in the mortgaged premises by proper 
written instrument. In view of the type of this appeal, 
it is submitted to the court that this Finding and Con-
clusion is conclusive against the appellant. It is pre-
sumed that the evidence justified the Finding. This 
Finding is a complete answer to the argument of appel-
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lant that there was no Finding on the Statute of Limi-
tations. The court found that the inchoate right of the 
appellant Nellie Luke was subject to the lien of plain-
tiff's mortgage sought to be foreclosed. This was an 
affirmative Finding. It was not required of the court 
that it find specifically that the lien of the mortgage 
was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, inasmuch 
as this affirmative Finding in itself shows conclusively 
that the mortgage was an enforcible lien obligation, not 
only as to the fee title owners, but also as to the inchoate 
interest of the appellant. In the state of the record and 
aippeal, the appellant cannot question this Finding. It 
is conclusive against her. The Finding was within the 
issue raised by respondent's complaint and the answer 
of said appellant. If the lien of the mortgage had been 
barred by the Statute of Limitations, then ipso facto it 
would not have been a lien on the inchoate interest of 
appellant. Therefore the Finding that said mortgage 
was an enforcible lien against the inchoate interest of 
appellant included a Finding that the defense of the 
Statute of Limitations was not sustained. 
II. 
THE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL IS NOT 
WHETHER THE PAYMENT OR ACKNOW-
LEDGMENT BY ONE MAKER OF A JOINT AND 
SEVERAL PROMISSORY NOTE TOLLS THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS TO ANOTHER 
MAKER. THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PRAY 
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FOR A DEFICIENCY AGAINST NELLIE LUKE. 
NO SUCH DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT WAS EN-
TERED AGAINST HER. THE ISSUE ON THIS 
APPEAL IS WHETHER THE LIEN OF THE 
MORTGAGE HEREIN SOUGHT TO BE FORE-
CLOSED AS AGAINST THE INCHOATE RIGHT 
OF THE APPELLANT, AS WIFE OF THE DE-
FENDANT, FRANCIS G. LUKE, WAS RELEAS-
ED OR DESTROYED BECAUSE THE PER-
SONAL OBLIGATION OF APPELLANT ON THE 
NOTE DATED DECEMBER 1, 1917 AND SIGN-
ED BY HER WAS BARRED. 
The solution of the problem in this case will depend 
upon the proper construction of Section 6406, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1917, reading in part as follows: 
"One-third in value of all of the legal or equit-
able estates in real property possessed by the 
husband at any time during the marriage AND 
TO WHICH THE WIFE HAD MADE NO RE-
LINQUISHMENT OF HER RIGHTS, shall be 
be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she 
survives him, etc." 
The right of the wife in the real property of the 
husband DURING THE LIFE OF THE HUSBAND 
under this Section, is not a new right, created by statute. 
The statute simply enlarged the right that had been con-
tinuous in the Territory of Utah and in the State of 
Utah since 1887. When common law dower was rein-
stated in the Territory it was simply declaratory of a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
right that existed. The same pre-requisites which gave 
and vested the right are necessary under this Section as 
are necessary under the common law dower as the same 
is applied in most States of the Union, namely, marriage, 
siezen by, and death of husband. Moreover, the amount 
or quantity given to the widow is the same in the one as 
in the other, the only difference being in the extent of its 
use. Under the law prior to the enactment of this Sec-
tion, the use was limited for the life of the widow, while 
under this Section it is enlarged to a fee simple estate. 
The one was limited; the other unlimited, and this is the 
only difference between the right prior to and after the 
enactment of this Section. The above statement is a 
paraphrase of the language of the court used in the fa-
mous case of 
Hilton vs. Thatcher 
88 Pac. 20 
31 Utah 360. 
It is a classic case defining the rights of a wife and 
widow in the real property of her husband. Our Supreme 
Court has had occasion to elaborate further its declara-
tion as to the wife's and widow's interest: In 
G-ee vs. Baum 
196 Pac. 680 
58 Utah 445. 
the Court said: 
' ' While it is true that under our statute, dow-
er by that name is abolished and the wife takes 
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one-third of her husband's real estate in fee if 
she survives him, yet unless she does survive him 
she has no interest in his real estate and the in-
terest of the wife although in fee is nevertheless 
a mere inchoate interest and depends entirely 
upon the condition that she survive her husand." 
In joining with him in a deed of lands to which he 
holds the legal title, she therefore merely releases her 
inchoate right and is not a grantor in the sense that she 
is the owner or joint owner of the title conveyed. In 
the case of 
H. T. C. Co. vs. Whitehouse, 
154 Pac. 950 
47 Utah 323 
our Supreme Court held that a wife during the life of 
her husband had no title to nor possession of her hus-
band's land. Her right is merely an inchoate interest 
during the life of her husband. I t will therefore be seen 
from these decisions that the appellant Nellie Luke had 
no title to the mortgaged premises; had no possession 
of the same, but an inchoate interest only as long as her 
husband, Francis G. Luke, lived. This inchoate interest 
would ripen into a fee simple title should she survive 
her husband, but dieing before her husband, this in-
choate interest vanishes. The Supreme Court has said 
that this interest is not an estate in real property, al-
though it is an interest which the courts will carefully 
protect. I t was this right or interest which the Dis-
trict Court foreclosed as against the appellant. This 
case was and is before the courts while the husband, 
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Francis G. Luke, lives. It is apparent, therefore, that 
if the appellant Nellie Luke did relinquish her right or 
interest in and to the mortgaged premises, then the 
judgment of the lower court is correct. If there was 
no relinquishment by the appellant, the District Court 
judgment is clearly in error. We are not interested in any 
personal liability of the appellant. There was no attempt 
by the respondent to affix a personal liability upon her. 
All it sought in its proceedings against appellant was to 
foreclose its mortgage of 1917 against her inchoate in-
terest under Section 6406. The mortgage sought to be 
foreclosed was executed by the appellant. She was a 
necessary and proper party to the action. The real ques-
tion to be answered is this: Was the execution of the 
mortgage of 1917 by the appellant such a relinquishment 
of her inchoate interest as Section 6406 contemplates? 
All other questions in this appeal are irrelevant. This 
is the question which must be answered by the court, 
III. 
WHERE A WIFE JOINS IN A MORTGAGE 
OF THE HUSBAND'S LANDS SECURING EITH-
ER HIS OR THEIR DEBT, PAYMENTS MADE 
BY HIM OR WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
OF THE DEBT MADE PRIOR TO BAR OF STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS WILL SUSPEND THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE AS TO THE 
WIFE'S INCHOATE DOWER RIGHT IN RE-
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SPECT TO FORECLOSURE OF THE MORT-
GAGE. 
It is admitted that the obligation due the respon-
dent was not barred as to the defendants Francis G. 
Luke and/or Alice G. Luke. They made payments on 
interest from time to time, and they executed renewal 
notes and mortgages. At all times the same obligation 
created by the 1917 notes and mortgage was valid and 
enforcible as against the husband of this appellant. The 
theory of respondent's action has been and is that while 
any personal obligation of the appellant Nellie Luke 
may have been barred by lapse of time, that she made 
due and proper relinquishment of her inchoate interest 
by the execution of the 1917 mortgage to secure the ob-
ligation recited therein and that so long as said obliga-
tion was due and owing the respondent just so long did 
this inchoate interest of the appellant stand mortgaged 
or pledged to the respondent. As before stated, the 
obligation remained the same throughout the years. The 
payment of the same was twice extended. It remained a 
personal and enforcible obligation against the true fee 
simple owners of the land. The rights of a wife during 
the lifetime of her husband, in her husband's real prop-
erty, under said Section 6406, are the same as at common 
law. 
Hilton vs. Thatcher (supra) 
and therefore the decisions of other States will be of 
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great aid and help. The question is not made peculiar 
to the State of Utah, because of statutory regulation. In 
the case of 
Clift vs. Williams 
51 SW. (Ky.) 
at page 821, the court said: 
" I t is clear that the wife having signed and 
acknowledged the mortgage and released and 
waived her dower and homestead right, cannot 
claim dower in such lands by reason of the statute 
above, as well as by reason of the fact that the 
mortgage itself is not barred by limitation. The 
widow's claim can only come through her hus-
band and her right dates from! his death and in 
no case where she signs the mortgage can she be 
in a better position than the purchaser with con-
structive notice." 
Im this case the court held that payments made on 
a note secured by a mortgage operate to extend the 
period of limitation as to the wife of the mortgagor who 
united in the mortgage. 
We quote from 
Jackson vs. Longwell 
64 Pac. (Kans.) 991 
"The second contention is that inasmuch as 
the statute of limitations has excused Mrs. Jack-
son from personal liability on the first note and 
as the property mortgaged to secure that note 
was her individual property, therefore no fore-
closure could be had of the mortgage which se-
cured that note. We cannot give this contention 
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our approval. This note in question was a joint 
and several obligation of both of the defendants. 
Mrs. Jackson mortgaged her property not only to 
secure the joint obligation of herself and hus-
band, but the obligation of each severally. The 
mortgage secured the obligation of the husband 
as fully as it secured the obligation of the wife. 
Of course, if the note had been barred as to both, 
then there would have remained no obligation to 
enforce; but until the obligation of both was dis-
charged by payment or otherwise, the lien of the 
mortgage remains enforcible. The statute of limi-
tations having run in favor of Mrs. Jackson dis-
charged her from her personal liability on the 
note and therefore she sustained the same rela-
tion to the note as though she had never signed it; 
but this in no way affected her agreement that her 
property should be subjected to the payment of 
her husband's debt evidenced by the note and the 
case remained the same as though he only had 
signed the note when it was made, and both had 
at that time given a mortgage to secure the note." 
In 
Perry vs. Horack 
64Pac. (Kans.) 990 
the husband and wife executed a mortgage upon their 
homestead. The husband died, leaving minor children 
and the mother and children continued to occupy the 
homestead. No payments were made on the note ex-
pressly for the children. Mrs. Horack made payments 
on her own behalf.. The court said the payments by Mrs. 
Horack certainly kept the note alive and the general 
rule is that the mortgage lives as long as the note it was 
given to secure. 
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"The minors were not parties to the note and 
mortgage but they inherited the land subject to 
the lien of the mortgage. * * * Payment by Mrs. 
Horack kept the debt alive and if we should treat 
these payments as for herself alone the mortgage 
would still be enforcible. If she alone had made 
the note and the children had joined in a mort-
gage on their property to secure it and the debt 
had been kept alive by payments of the maker, 
no one would contend that the mortgage would be 
barred as to the childen or that it would be affect-
ed by the failure to make payments or otherwise 
acknowledge the existence of the debt." 
See also the case of 
Investment Securities Co. vs. Manwarren 
68 Pac. (Kans.) 68 
Here the court said: 
"The fact that the property in this case is 
shown to be the homestead of the mortgagors is 
not important. It is the creation of the lien on 
the homestead without the joint consent of both 
husband and wife which is prohibited by the Con-
stitution. Here such consent was given. The 
mortgage debt has not been repaid. The husband 
by payment of interest upon the debt within the 
statutory period tolled the statute and preserved 
the cause of action against himself upon the debt 
and as against both for the foreelosure of the 
mortgage. The case thus stands precisely in the 
same attitude as though the wife had not in the 
first instance executed the note with her husband, 
but had executed the mortgage securing the same. 
In such case the right to foreclose the mortgage 
would scarcely be questioned. * * * While the 
obligation for the payment of this debt against 
both husband and wife remained enforcible, a 
contract for the extension of the time of payment 
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of the debt was entered into between the mort-
gagee and the husband alone. It was not the in-
tention of the parties by this extension to create 
a new mortgage lien on the homestead, neither 
was it the intention of the parties thereto to 
change the priority of the mortgage lien nor to 
re-create a lien by mortgage on the homestead; 
for none had been lost, destroyed or changed. The 
wife not being a party to this contract, her obli-
gation for the payment of the debt remained 
wholly unaffected thereby. It neither operated 
to afford her a discharge from the obligation to 
pay the debt nor to release the property pledged 
as security for its payment. As to her the con-
tract of extension was wholly ineffectual to sus-
pend the running of the statute of limitations 
upon her obligation for the payment of the debt. 
Her rights remained the same as though this ex-
tension agreement had not been made. It being 
within the power of the husband to suspend the 
running of the statute of limitations as against 
himself upon his obligation to pay the debt by an 
acknowledgement of a subsisting liability, there-
fore either by the making of payments thereon or 
by an acknowledgement in writing of an existing 
liability as by statute provided for tolling the 
statute of limitations and as the mortgage re-
mained enforcible so long as his obligation to pay 
the debt remained enforcible in law it follows 
and must be held in an action to recover the debt 
and to foreclose the mortgage the statute of limi-
tations cannot be successfully interposed by 
either husband or wife to defeat the mortgage 
lien so long as the right of action to recover the 
debt may be maintained against either." 
We refer to the case of 
Skinner vs. Moore 
67 Pac. (Kans.) 827 
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Here payments of interest were made on the 
note from time to time by the husband without 
knowledge of the wife. The statute of limitations 
had not run on the note against the maker (the 
-husband) by reason of interest payments made 
by him. The court said: 
" A recovery on the note was never barred by 
the statute of limitations. No one except the 
husband was obligated to pay the debt evidenced 
by the note. The mortgage was a conditional 
conveyance securing the payment of the note so 
long as it was a valid and existing demand 
against the maker.'' 
Turning to the Mississippi reports, we find the case 
of 
Smith vs. Scherck 
60 Miss. 491 
This case involved a mortgage on a homestead executed 
by both husband and wife. The court said: 
" I t remains, despite the statute (the Home-
stead statute) the exclusive property of the hus-
band where the legal title resides in him but with 
the limitation upon the jus disponendi by which 
he is prevented from selling or encumbering it 
without the conjoint act of the wife. When, how-
ever, she gave her assent in the mode appointed 
by law, it is operative to its full effect and can 
neither be recalled nor restricted by her. When 
therefore she joins in a mortgage of it to secure 
a debt the property quoad the mortgage ceases 
to be a homestead and is bound as any other 
property of the husband would be; and as long 
therefore as the debt is kept alive by him who 
owes it, the mortgage remains in full force. Hav-
ing consented that it might be bound for that 
debt it must so continue until the debt be dis-
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charged by valid judgment or by such lapse of 
time as constitutes a valid bar in behalf of the 
debtor." 
The State of Vermont offers us the case of 
Gay's Estate vs. Hassam, et al. 
24 Atl. 715 
wherein the court said: 
"If Naomi B. Hassam (the wife) were a 
grantee of George P. Hassam, (the husband,) one 
of the mortgagors, she would be affected by) the 
acknowledgement thus made by him, and she is 
affected in no less degree by reason of being her-
self one of the mortgagors. But she claims that 
in equity she should be regarded as surety for the 
payment of her husband's note and that under 
our statute relating to joint contractors she is 
not affected by the payment or acknowledgement 
made by him. By joining with her husband in a 
mortgage of her real estate to secure his debt she 
did not become a joint contractor. She incurred 
no personal liability by so doing. The statute re-
ferred to has reference to parties incurring a per-
sonal liability and has no reference to a right 
of entry into house and lands." 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in the case of 
Roberts vs. Roberts, 
10 No. Dak. 531 
88N.W. 290 
uses this language: 
"By executing the mortgage to secure the debt 
of her husband she consented that her homestead 
right should become subject to the payment of 
his debt without any restrictions unless the debt 
and mortgage became barred by the running of 
the statute of limitations. She waived her home-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stead right with knowledge that the husband had 
the right to pay the debt and is bound by his acts 
so long as her rights have not been unlawfully in-
fringed upon. Par t payment by the husband in a 
legal manner during the life of the mortgage is 
not such an act as discharges the mortgage as to 
her, although it had the effect of continuing the 
lien of the mortgage longer than it would other-
wise have continued. * * * In this case the debt 
exists so far as the husband is concerned. So 
does the mortgage also, each by virtue of the pay-
ments made by the husband and were effective in 
keeping the mortgage in force as to her . " 
The same court in 
Hanson vs. Branner, 
204 N . W . (No. Dak.) 856 
affirms the Roberts case and after quoting from the 
Roberts case as we have done, uses this language: 
" There is no construction that can be placed 
upon this language other than that the partial 
payments made by the husband extended not only 
the life of the note but the life of the mortgage as 
well. There is no difference between the case at 
bar and the case of Roberts vs. Roberts. The 
wife in both cases signed with her husband a 
mortgage upon the homestead. The husband 
without the knowledge of the wife made partial 
payments which tolled the bar as to the note and 
mortgage. ' ' 
The case of 
Mahon vs. Cooley 
36 Iowa 479 
is in point. The mortgage was upon a homestead. I t 
was executed by both husband and wife. A written ac-
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knowledgment was made by the husband alone. The 
court says: 
"The next question for our consideration in-
volves the power of the husband by reviving the 
cause of action, without the concurrence of the 
wife, to keep alive the lien of the mortgage upon 
the! homestead after the expiration of the period 
of limitation. Defendant's counsel insist that the 
instrument under which the revivor is claimed to 
be effected for that purpose so far as the home-
stead is concerned, should be signed by the wife 
as well as the husband. * * * The mortgage was 
executed to secure the debt of which the note 
is evidence and its lien is not released until pay-
ment or other discharge. The evidence of the in-
debtedness may be changed or it may be trans-
fered to other parties, yet the mortgage will fol-
low it and will be valid as long as the debt can be 
enforced. It is then but an incident of the debt. 
Its existence is measured and prolonged by the 
life of the debt. These are familiar doctrines 
that do not require for their support the citation 
f of authorities. Whatever may be the wife's in-
terest in the homestead, she conveyed it by the 
mortgage to secure the debt and it follows from 
the foregoing rule that the mortgage will bind 
her interest until the debt is discharged." 
We also quote from 
37 Corpus Juris—page 1162, Sec. 642. 
"Where a wife joins her husband in a note 
and mortgage, and mortgages her land to secure 
it, or mortgages her land to secure his individual 
note, or joins him in a mortgage of the homestead 
to secure a note executed by him alone, or their 
joint note, or joins in a mortgage of the husband's 
land securing his individual debt for the purpose 
of relinquishing dower and homestead rights 
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payments made by him will suspend the statute 
as to her in respect of foreclosure of the mort-
gage." 
We also set forth this quotation from 
17 Ruling Case Law, Sec. 297, page 934 
'' Thus if a husband and wife execute a mort-
gage on their homestead to secure the payment of 
a note made by him only, his payment of interest 
periodically, though without her knowledge, has 
been held to stop the running of the s tatute ." 
See also: 
Jones on Mortgages, Vol. 2, 8th Ed. Sec, 1536. 
Under community property law the husband's ac-
knowledgment of the mortgage debt, without knowledge 
of the wife, removes the bar of the statute of limitations 
and keeps the debt alive and the debt being an enforcible 
claim, the lien of the mortgage remains. In applying 
the foregoing rule from community property states to 
the statutes of Utah, with particular reference to Section 
6406, and the wife's rights thereunder, the following 
similarities between the wife's right under community 
property rules and under Section 6406 should be kept in 
mind. In both cases: 
(a) The wife must join in deed and mortgage to 
release her rights in land; 
(b) Her right remains inchoate during life of hus-
band, but she takes a fee simple interest on his death if 
she survives him; 
(c) Her right is contingent on the fact that she 
survives him; 
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(d) The husband can deal with the land as his 
own except as to conveying or encumbering same, when 
the consent of his wife is necessary. 
With such similarities existing,, it is submitted that 
the authorities hereinafter quoted are in point and are 
of value to the court in this discussion. In 
Cook vs. Stellmon 
251 Pac. (Idaho) 957 
the court says: 
"The agreement between Stellmon, husband, 
mortgagor and appellant (the mortgagee) to 
postpone the date of indebtedness created no 
further incumbrance on the property than already 
existing. It neither enlarged nor diminished the 
original obligation. It simply postponed the time 
of the debt. 
Investment Securities Co. vs. Manwarren 
64 Kans. 636 
68 Pac. 68." 
See also from the State of Washington: 
Catlin vs. Mills 
247 Pac, 1013 
47 A. L. B. 546. 
We respectfully submit that the execution of the 
1917 mortgage by the appellant, Nellie Luke, was exactly 
the kind of a relinquishment Section 6406 contemplates. 
She mortgaged her inchoate interest to secure a debt, 
and during the time the debt, which was a joint and 
several one, exists against any of the makers, the 
lien of the mortgage operates against this inchoate 
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interest. It was the joint debt of the three persons who 
signed the 1917 note and it was the several debt of each 
of them. It may well be barred as to appellant by lapse 
of time but the joint and several obligation of Francis G. 
Luke and Alice G. Luke remained, and so long as this 
obligation remained enforcible just so long was this in-
choate interest of the wife, Nellie Luke, pledged for 
security. There is no escape from this conclusion under 
the authorities cited. It will be noted that the premises 
in question were burdened with a mortgage at the time 
that Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke took title to the 
same, and the mortgage of 1917 in which the appellant 
joined specifically recited that it was a mortgage in re-
newal of the mortgage obligation existing against the 
premises at the time Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke 
became the owners of same. Nellie Luke did not become 
an owner of this land. Her interest was that of a wife 
only. Therefore when she signed the note in 1917 she 
was not renewing any obligation of her own. She had 
no title to the land. It was her husband and Alice G. 
Luke who were the owners and who would naturally be 
interested in securing an extension within which to pay 
the mortgage indebtedness. Therefore this case clearly 
is one wherein Nellie Luke relinquished and released her 
inchoate dower interest for the purpose of securing the 
payment of an obligation which was her husband's and 
if she had never signed the 1917 note, but only the 1917 
mortgage (which she did) still her inchoate interest 
would be subject to the mortgage lien until her husband's 
obligation was paid or barred by lapse of time. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
IV. 
THE MORTGAGES AND NOTES SIGNED 
BY FRANCIS G. LUKE AND ALICE G. LUKE 
IN THE YEARS 1920 AND 1923 WERE RENEW-
AL OR EXTENSION NOTES ONLY. 
41 Corpus Juris 806 
5 Thompson's Eeal Property, Sec. 4711. 
We do not think that this proposition can be ques-
tioned. At the time that Francis G. Luke and Alice G. 
Luke took title to the mortgaged premises, it was al-
ready burdened with a mortgage in favor of respondent. 
(Findings 4, 5 and 6, Abs. pages 22 and 23). At the time 
of the maturity of this mortgage obligation, the mort-
gagee naturally required the new owners of the premis-
es, Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke, to execute new 
mortgage papers. This was in 1917 and it was this 
mortgage that appellant executed, and it was at this time 
she relinquished her inchoate interest as wife. The 
mortgages and notes of 1920 and 1923 were under the 
authorities cited, but extension agreements. The trial 
court so found. (Findings 8, 9,10, 11 and 13. Abs. pages 
24, 25, 26). These Findings are conclusive upon the ap-
pellate court in the present state of the record. There-
fore the original obligation assumed by Francis G. Luke 
and Alice G. Luke in 1917 was kept alive, not only by 
the execution of these new mortgage extension papers, 
but by the admitted payment of interest made by them. 
Nellie Luke had relinquished in 1917 her inchoate inter-
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est to assist in securing the payment of this obligation— 
an obligation which admittedly was valid and enf orcible 
against Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke at the time 
of the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. The 
conclusion is inescapable that the trial court was entirely 
correct in making and entering its Finding No. 15 and its 
Conclusion of Law No. 4. It is submitted that the judg-
ment should in all respects be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
POWERS, RITER & COWAN, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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